36 accidents of Airbus aircraft since 2000

The Airbus A321 operated by Air Busan was scheduled to operate from Busan-Gimhae, South Korea, to Hong Kong, China. There were 170 passengers and 6 crew members on board. While the aircraft was still parked at the gate after boarding, a fire broke out in the rear section of the cabin. The crew ordered an emergency evacuation. All 176 occupants evacuated the aircraft. The aircraft was destroyed by the fire.

The Airbus A350-900 operated by JAL Japan Airlines took off from Sapporo, Japan, for a passenger flight to Tokyo, Japan. 367 passengers and 12 crewmembers were onboard. The A350 landed on Tokyo airport in nighttime conditions but collided with Japanese Coast Guard aircraft on the runway upon touchdown. The nose landing gear collapsed and the A350 burst into flames. The A350 came to a stop down on the runway and was evacuated. All 379 occupants escaped, and the A350 burned down. 17 occupants of the A350 received injuries. The Coast Guard aircraft also burst into flames: its captain was seriously injured, and the five other occupants were killed.

The Airbus A320-200 operated by LATAM Airlines Chile, took off from Lima, Peru, for a passenger flight to Juliaca, Peru. 102 passengers and 6 crewmembers were onboard. The plane was accelerating for takeoff when multiple fire trucks crossed the runway in front of the aircraft. The crew rejected takeoff at high speed but couldn’t avoid collision with one of the fire trucks. The right main gear collapsed causing the aircraft to veer right towards the right-hand runway edge. A fire erupted on right hand engine at the moment of the collision. All occupants were able to evacuate the aircraft: 4 passengers received serious injuries, and 36 passengers received minor injuries. Two fire fighters on board the truck were killed, and a third one received serious injuries.

The Airbus A330-300 operated by Korean Airlines took off from Seoul, South Korea, for a passenger flight to Cebu City, Philippines. 162 passengers and 11 crewmembers were onboard. The plane had gone around at low height twice following approaches to Cebu's airport. The Airbus A330 then landed but overran the runway end at high speed and came to rest about 360 meters (1200 feet) past the runway end close to the airport perimeter fence. The aircraft received substantial damage. All the occupants escaped uninjured.

The Airbus A320 operated by Pakistan International Airlines took off from Lahore, Pakistan, for a passenger flight to Karachi, Pakistan. 91 passengers and 8 crewmembers were onboard. After a first aborted approach to Karachi the plane positioned for a second one, but crashed short of the runway in a residential area. 97 occupants were killed, and 2 passengers survived. 4 people on the ground were taken to hospitals with burns.

The Airbus A320-200 operated by Egyptair took off from Paris, France, for a passenger flight to Cairo, Egypt. 56 passengers and 10 crewmembers were onboard. The plane was enroute at FL370 (around 11 km) over the Mediterranean Sea about 210 NM (390 km) north-northwest of Cairo when the transponder signals of the aircraft ceased. The aircraft was located crashed in the Mediterranean Sea. All 66 people onboard were killed. The crew was talking normally to Greek air traffic control a few minutes prior the crash. When Air traffic Controllers attempted to hand the aircraft off to Egypt the crew did not respond, radar contact was lost 2 minutes after the first attempt to raise the crew for hand off. The Egyptian authorities published the following elements about the accident: The flight recorders stopped operating while the aircraft was in cruise at an altitude of 37,000 feet; The aircraft systems sent ACARS messages indicating the presence of smoke in toilets and the avionics bay; The data from the data recorder confirms these messages; The playback of the cockpit voice recorder reveals, in particular, that the crew mentioned the existence of a fire on board; Several pieces of debris were retrieved from the accident site. Some of these had signs of having been subject to high temperatures, and traces of soot. In addition, the BEA had collected the following elements: A signal from an emergency locator transmitter was sent at 00:37 (source CNES (3) ) i.e. around eight minutes after the transmission of the last ACARS message; Data from a Greek primary radar (sent by the Greek authorities to the BEA) shows that the aeroplane had descended in a turn until collision with the surface of the water. Based on these elements, the BEA considers that the most likely hypothesis is that a fire broke out in the cockpit while the aeroplane was flying at its cruise altitude and that the fire spread rapidly resulting in the loss of control of the aeroplane.

The Airbus A321-200 operated by Metrojet took off from Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, for a passenger flight to St. Petersburg, Russia. 217 passengers and 7 crewmembers were onboard. 23 minutes after takeoff, while the plane was over the Sinai desert, it plummeted from the sky and crashed in Wadi Al-Zolomat, about 60 NM south of Al-Arish. All 224 occupants were killed. The plane departed the Red Sea resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, near the southern tip of the Sinai. It vanished from radar 23 minutes into the flight, while it was climbing through FL307 over the Sinai desert. There was no distress call from the crew. The wreckage has located in mountainous terrain straight below the last transmitted transponder position. The debris field expands 350 by 3200 meters (1150 by 10460 feet). Due to the large surface of the debris field, investigators believe that the aircraft broke up in midair. According to Egyptian Authorities, there is no evidence of hostile or missile activity around the flight path of the aircraft. The weather in the area was clear at the time of the accident. The director of Russia's Federal Security Service stated that he has studied the passengers’ personal belongings and luggage and fragments of the plane that crashed in Egypt. An expert examination of all these objects has found traces of foreign-made explosives. According to the experts, a self-made explosive device equivalent up to 1 kg of TNT was set off on board, which explains why the fragments of the aircraft were scattered over a large area. On November 17th 2015, the cause of the accident has been officially recognised as being a terrorist act.

The Airbus A400M Atlas military transport plane operated by Airbus Defence and Space took off from Sevilla airport for a test flight. Shortly after takeoff the plane lost altitude, crashed in a field and burned. 6 crewmembers were onboard. 4 people were killed, and 2 people were seriously injured. The aircraft took off from runway 09 at 12:54 hours local time. Weather conditions were good. The aircraft was newly built. It was intended to be delivered soon to the Turkish Air Force. For that purpose, the pilot, co-pilot, a mechanic and three engineers were conducting a test flight. The aircraft took off, climbed but started to lose altitude about 2 minutes after takeoff and crashed around 1 minute later.

The Airbus A320 operated by Air Canada from Toronto, Ontario, Canada for a passenger flight to Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. There were 133 passengers and 5 crew members on board. The plane crashed on landing at Halifax airport. All the occupants exited the aircraft. 25 people were taken to hospital for treatment of injuries. Weather conditions were bad with heavy winds and snowfalls at the time of the accident. The plane collided with terrain approximately 1100 feet (335 meters) from the threshold of Runway 05, eventually coming to rest about 1100 feet (335 meters) down the runway. The initial impact was significant and caused substantial damage to the aircraft. The main landing gear separated and the underside of the aircraft was heavily damaged (fuselage and wings). During this impact, the aircraft collided with a localizer antenna array – part of the instrument landing system – and became airborne again, travelling forward on Runway 05. There is an extensive debris field between the localizer antenna location and the threshold of the runway.

The A320-200 operated by Germanwings took off from Barcelona, Spain, for a passenger flight to Dusseldorf, Germany. 144 passengers and 6 crewmembers were onboard. The plane was enroute at FL380 about 30nm southeast of Marseille (France) when the aircraft initiated a rapid descent and crash in the Alps, about 12nm southwest of Barcelonnette (France), 75nm northeast of Marseille. The 150 people onboard were killed. The aircraft reached its cruising altitude at FL380. A few minutes later the aircraft initiated a descend. It descended from FL380 through FL110 in 8 minutes (average rate of descent 3375 ft/min). The last radar position recorded by French ATC was at 6175 feet MSL on a northeasterly heading of 26 degrees true. Mountains rise up to 8900 feet about 1NM north of the last reported aircraft position. The aircraft impacted ground at very high speed (at about 500 km/h) and was completely destroyed. Both CVR and DFDR (black boxes) were recovered. The first officer was alone in the cockpit when the plane started the descent, until the crash. The captain left the cockpit for a toilet break. The first officer was not talking, only normal breathing could be heard after the captain departed the cockpit. The captain was not able to get back into the cockpit. The first officer initiated a rapid descent, there was no reason to initiate the rapid descent, there was no reason to not communicate with air traffic control, and there was no reason why the door wouldn't open. Breathing of the first officer is not consistent with someone suffering a heart attack or other health issue. Other than that there is absolute silence in the cockpit, screams are heard only in the last few moments. There were no words heard during the last 10 minutes of the flight. Investigations showed that the pilot in the cockpit used the autopilot to descend the aircraft down to 100 feet, on several occasions the speed of the aircraft was adjusted during the descent. Investigators stated the first officer deliberately crashed the aircraft, and kept locked the cockpit door to avoid the captain coming back in the cockpit. Cockpit door functioning

The AirAsia Indonesia Airbus A320-200 took off from Surabaya, Indonesia, for a passenger flight to Singapore, Singapore. 155 passengers and 7 crewmembers were onboard. The plane disappeared from radar screen while it was enroute at FL320 over the Java Sea. Debris and bodies have been recovered in the Java Sea. All 162 people onboard were killed. The aircraft experienced difficult weather conditions with storm cells while it was cruising over the java sea at FL320. The crew requested to deviate left of its airway and to climb to FL380. At that time, the aircraft was observed normally. Due to other traffic the aircraft could not get cleared to FL380 instantly and was cleared to FL340 at first. When the aircraft was radioed with the clearance to climb to FL340, there was no response anymore, but the aircraft was still visible on radar screens (the ADS-B was still emitting). 1 minute later, the aircraft disappeared from radar screen. The last recorded position was about 110 NM East-South-East of Pulau Belitung. There were seven aircraft passing through the area at that time at flight levels between 290 and 380, neither of them encountered any difficulties. Debris and bodies of the aircraft have been located two days later, on Dec 30th 2014, in the Java Sea about 110 NM from Pulau Belitung, about 5 NM (8 km) from the last radar position. Bigger debris of what appeared to be the aircraft wreckage have been located 40 Nm (70 km) from the last radar position. Both black boxes (CVR and DFDR) have been founded more than two weeks after the accident, on January 13th 2015. AirAsia Indonesia did not have a license to fly the Surabaya-to-Singapore route the day the accident occurred. The airline was approved to fly the route four days a week but it did not include Sunday. AirAsia Indonesia is a subsidiary of the Malaysian-based AirAsia group. The parent company owns almost 49% of the Indonesian operation.

The Airbus A300-600F operated by UPS took off from Louisville, KY, USA, for a cargo flight to Birmingham, AL, USA. 2 crewmembers were onboard. The plane crashed half-mile short of Birmingham’s runway in open terrain and burst into flames. Both occupants were killed. The accident occurred while the plane was on approach to Birmingham's runway 18. The plane touched down in an isolated grassy field on the outskirts of Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport, near the intersection Airport Road/Tarrant Huffman Road about half-mile short of the runway. The aircraft crashed, struck a massive hardwood tree and broke up. The nose of the plane was detached from the body. The plane skidded, leaving a trail of debris, and burst into flame. A piece of the fuselage and an engine are visible on the crest of the hill. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were rainy with low clouds. No people on the ground or houses on the ground were affected.

The AirBlue Airbus A321-200 was performing a passenger flight from Karachi, Pakistan to Islamabad, Pakistan with 146 passengers and 6 crew. The plane was on approach to Islamabad in poor weather conditions when the airplane impacted the terrain. All 152 occupants of the airplane perished in the crash. Monsoon rain and low visibility were prevailing during the Airbus A321 approach to Islamabad airport. The airplane had first approached the airport from the Southeast (suggesting an approach to runway 30), and ended by a go-around. The crew was about to try a second attempt from the Northwest (suggesting an approach to runway 12). While repositioning for the second approach the airplane impacted the Margalla Hills. The location of the impact is about 10 NM (18 km) North of the airport at a height of about 1000 feet (300 meters) above the airport. At the time of the arrival runway 12 was active. The airplane was performing an ILS approach to runway 30 circling runway 12. Initial investigation results suggest the airplane was flying too low in poor weather conditions and low visibility and incorrectly turned too late.

The Airbus A300B4-203F cargo plane, operated by AeroUnion, took off from Mexico city, Mexico, on a cargo service to Los Angeles, CA, USA, with an en route stop at Monterrey, Mexico. Five crewmembers were onboard. The plane was destroyed when it crashed on final approach to Monterrey-Gen Mariano Escobedo Airport. All five crew members were killed as well as one person on the ground. The flight had been cleared to land in Monterrey airport. It was approaching in poor weather conditions, with rain showers and thunderstorms, when it crashed onto the Avenida Miguel Alemán motorway, almost 2 km short of the runway threshold. It struck a car, killing the driver. The airplane broke up and burst into flames.

The Airbus A310-304 owned by International Lease Finance Corporation and operated by Yemenia Airways was on a passenger flight from Sana'a, Yemen, to Moroni, Comoros. The plane was carrying 142 passengers and 11 crewmembers. It crashed into the ocean as it approached the Indian Ocean archipelago of Comoros in bad weather.

The Air France Airbus A330-200 went missing on transatlantic flight from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to Paris, France. The airplane carried 12 crew members and 216 passengers. The plane crashed in the Atlantic Ocean, killing all onboard. Flight AF447 departed Rio de Janeiro heading toward Paris. Three hours later, while the plane was flying over the Atlantic Ocean, the aircraft reportedly went through a thunderstorm with strong turbulence. A few minutes later, Air France received an automatic message from the A330 indicating electrical circuits malfunction. It was the last information received from AF447. Six minutes later, Brazilian Air Force said plane failed to make previously scheduled radio contact with Brazil. Last radio contact with the flight was at 01:33 UTC. The crew was in contact with the Atlantic Area Control Centre (CINDACTA III) when the flight reported over the INTOL waypoint, estimating TASIL at 02:20 UTC. INTOL is an RNAV waypoint located in the Atlantic Ocean, 565 km from Natal, Brazil. The TASIL waypoint is located 1228 kilometers from Natal. Over a time span of four minutes, starting at 02:10 UTC, a series of ACARS messages were sent -automatically- from the plane. Indication was that the autopilot had disengaged and the fly by wire system had changed to alternate law (mode allowing the flight control to work properly while some inputs parameters are not available or detected as erroneous). Between 02:11Z and 02:13Z a flurry of messages indicating failure of navigation and air data systems arrived. At 02:13Z flight control system faults were indicated, at 02:14Z the last message received was an advisory regarding cabin vertical speed. An analysis of meteorological information shows that AF447 crossed through three key thunderstorm clusters: a small one around 01:51 UTC, a new rapidly growing one at about 01:59 UTC, and finally a large multicell convective system (MCS) around 02:05-02:16 UTC.

The Airbus A320 operated by US Airways jet en route to Charlotte, N.C, USA, from New York City, USA, crashed into the Hudson River off the west side of Manhattan with 150 passengers and five crew members. All of the people on board had managed to escape alive. Within three minutes of take-off the plane was in trouble. A loud bang came from close to the wings on both sides as it hit a flock of geese, and smoke and fire began to appear from the engines. The plane's pilot reported a bird strike and declared an emergency. As the Airbus A320 quickly banked south, the plane lost power and rapidly dropped altitude, heading towards the icy waters of the Hudson river. The crew attempted a ditching. It was a slow contact with the water, and the plane remained in one part, and rapidly stopped in the water. The A320 was then rapidly submerged in the icy waters up to the windows. Rescue crews pulled passengers in yellow life vests from the plane. Several boats surrounded the scene.

An Air New Zealand passenger jet on a test flight with seven crew aboard has crashed into the Mediterranean Sea, off Saint-Cyprien (France), killing at least two people. The five other people are reported missing. The crashed Airbus A320 had been undergoing maintenance checks at EAS Industries in Perpignan, before it took off on a test flight for roughly one hour. The plane returned to Perpignan after having completed the flight, and while on approach to Perpignan Airport, the plane crashed in the Mediterranean sea, 7 km off the French coast. The plane had just been returned to Air New Zealand after flying for XL Airways. Maintenance operations performed by the EAS company was part of the process to return the plane to its owner.

The Airbus A310 belonging to Sudan Airways was on a passenger flight from Amman, Jordan, to Khartoum, Sudan, with an enroute stop at Damascus, Syria. 203 passengers and 11 crewmembers were onboard. The flight came in to land at Khartoum in poor weather when it crashed. The airplane burst into flames. 30 occupants perished. Just after landing, the plane veered off the runway. There was an explosion in one of the engines, starting a fire that then spread to the inside of the plane. Television pictures showed flames tearing through the upper section of the fuselage. An emergency escape slide could be seen attached to one of the central doors of the plane, showing that crew or passengers had time to actuate evacuations devices. Many passengers had managed to escape the aircraft without injury or with burn wounds. 30 people have been killed in the accident, among which 29 passengers and one crewmember. It was difficult for the authorities to know exactly who boarded the plane. Some passengers had gone home directly after the crash making an exact count difficult. According to a meteorologist, a sandstorm had hit the area between some 6 hours before the accident, and there was a thunderstorm at the time of the crash.

The Airbus A320 belonging to TACA International Airlines was operating a scheduled flight between San Salvador (El Salvador) and Miami (United States), with a stop at Tegucigalpa (Honduras). The aircraft departed San Salvador with 124 passengers and crew members onboard and landed on runway 02 at Tegucigalpa Airport. But the aircraft was unable to stop on the runway and ended up in a ditch after crossing a road. 3 people onboard were killed (including one pilot and two passengers), and 2 other people were killed on the ground when the aircraft struck their car. The cloud ceiling was very low at the time of the accident and visibility was reduced. A first approach to Tegucigalpa Airport ended in a go-around. During the second approach, the pilot managed to land the aircraft, but the plane reportedly touched down too far along the runway and no longer had enough distance to stop. The aircraft violently overran the runway before ending up in a 20-meter-deep ditch. The Airbus A320 broke into three sections, but no fire broke out despite a large amount of fuel leaking from the aircraft. Rescue teams found two cars crushed beneath the aircraft. Runway 02/20 at Tegucigalpa Airport is 1,863 meters long and 45 meters wide. The runway surface is asphalt. Since the airport is located at an altitude of 1,000 meters, aircraft takeoff and landing performance is lower than at sea level. In addition, the mountains surrounding the area make approaches particularly difficult. At the time of the accident, the runway was wet.

The brand new Airbus A340-600 was carrying out engine-run-ups within Airbus facilities in Toulouse, France, and was due to be delivered to Etihad a few days later. For undetermined reasons, the aircraft accelerated quickly and smashed into a blast concrete barrier. The plane broke in two a few meters aft the cockpit, and ended tilted on the right and laying on the tail. Among the 9 people onboard, 2 sustained serous injuries and 2 sustained minor injuries. 1 person on ground has also been seriously injured. There is no fatality. Engine-run-ups are usual before aircraft deliveries. It consists of increasing the throttle, sometimes up to full throttle, while monitoring engine behaviour. The purpose of those tests is to ensure the engines behave as it is designed for, or to tune them. Such tests are performed in dedicated area surrounded by concrete wall protecting from engine blast. In order to prevent the plane from moving, parking brakes are engaged and wheel blocks are installed. In case anything goes wrong, the crew must reduce the throttle immediately.

TAM Flight 3054 was a regular flight from Porto Alegre, Brazil, to São Paulo-Congonhas, Brazil. The plane was carrying 181 passengers and 6 crewmembers when it crashed on landing, killing all people onboard and 11 people on ground. The Airbus A320, operated by TAM SA, the country's biggest airline, skid off the end of the rain-soaked runway on landing, cleared the airport fence at the end of the runway and the busy highway but slammed into a gas station and a TAM building, causing an inferno. The video of the landing shows the plane speeding up after touching down very close to the designated limit for landings. The airline also said one of the Airbus 320's two thrust reversers was deactivated. Flying with only one thrust reverser is allowed and safe, but reduces braking power.

The Sibir (S7) airline Airbus A-310 was on a passenger flight from Moscow to Irkutsk (Siberia, regional capital close to Lake Baikal) with 203 people on board. While landing, the aircraft overshot the runway, smashed through a concrete fence, struck garages and caught fire. 74 people escaped from the wreckage through the rear of the jet, many of them seriously injured. At least 129 people were killed. The front of the fuselage was completely destroyed by the blaze, which took fire-fighters three hours to extinguish. It is established that the aircraft veered off the runway in rain. Black boxes need to be analysed to understand the cause of the accident. Crew errors are not excluded. Braking systems malfunctions may also have contributed to the accident. S7 Airlines was known until recently as Sibir, or Siberia Airlines. It is the second largest Russian airline, after the state-controlled Aeroflot, with 100 flights a day out of its hubs in Moscow, Irkutsk and Novosibirsk in Siberia.

The A320 operating Armavia flight RNV 967 from Erevan (Armenia), to Sochi (Russia) disappeared from radar screens while it was performing its second approach. The crew had first decided to abort the landing because of the weather conditions, and to come back to the departure airport. A few minutes later, the crew finally decided to land at Sochi airport. During this second approach, the plane plummeted into the black sea 6 km off shore. The crew did not send any distress call. All 105 passengers and 8 crew members were killed. At the time of the accident, the weather conditions were poor: horizontal visibility reduced at 1,500 m and vertical visibility reduced at 500 ft, presence of thunder clouds, light wind and light rain showers. The black boxes and parts of the plane have been rapidly localised at a depth of 1500 ft (450 meters). The black boxes have been recovered and analysed. It was reported that the technical side was not to blame, and the whole blame is put on the “human factor”. But it is not reported whether it was the pilot or the air traffic controller. Questions are raised to understand why the crew decided to land at Sochi airport under poor weather conditions after having initially decided to come back to their departure airport. The crash could be due to a speed loss, leading to a stall. The aircraft altitude was not enough make a recovery maneuver. An unaddressed but widely embraced speculation circulated that human error was to blame for the deaths. Specifically, as it is popularly known, the first few days of May are traditionally days of heavy drinking in Russia. Some believe that control tower personnel were incapacitated by vodka and were incapable of performing their duties. The rumour was fuelled especially after Sochi authorities were said to have secluded the air traffic controller on duty the night of May 3. Another version of the cause of the disaster is that a brawl broke out by powerful persons on board who demanded that the pilot lands the plane, regardless of safety concerns. The A320, registered under the number EK-32009, began operating for Armavia in February 2004. The aircraft had accumulated over 28,200 flight hours in close to 14,400 flights.

The Air France Airbus A340-313 aircraft (registration F-GLZQ, serial number 0289) departed Paris, France, at 1153 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) as Air France Flight 358 on a scheduled flight to Toronto, Ontario, with 297 passengers and 12 crew members on board. Before departure, the flight crew members obtained their arrival weather forecast, which included the possibility of thunderstorms. While approaching Toronto, the flight crew members were advised of weather-related delays. On final approach, they were advised that the crew of an aircraft landing ahead of them had reported poor braking action, and Air France Flight 358's aircraft weather radar was displaying heavy precipitation encroaching on the runway from the northwest. At about 200 feet above the runway threshold, while on the instrument landing system approach to Runway 24L with autopilot and autothrust disconnected, the aircraft deviated above the glideslope and the groundspeed began to increase. The aircraft crossed the runway threshold about 40 feet above the glideslope. During the flare, the aircraft travelled through an area of heavy rain, and visual contact with the runway environment was significantly reduced. There were numerous lightning strikes occurring, particularly at the far end of the runway. The aircraft touched down about 3800 feet down the runway, reverse thrust was selected about 12.8 seconds after landing, and full reverse was selected 16.4 seconds after touchdown. The aircraft was not able to stop on the 9000-foot runway and departed the far end at a groundspeed of about 80 knots. The aircraft stopped in a ravine at 2002 UTC (1602 eastern daylight time) and caught fire. All passengers and crew members were able to evacuate the aircraft before the fire reached the escape routes. A total of 2 crew members and 10 passengers were seriously injured during the crash and the ensuing evacuation. Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors The crew conducted an approach and landing in the midst of a severe and rapidly changing thunderstorm. There were no procedures within Air France related to distance required from thunderstorms during approaches and landing, nor were these required by regulations. After the autopilot and autothrust systems were disengaged, the pilot flying (PF) increased the thrust in reaction to a decrease in the airspeed and a perception that the aircraft was sinking. The power increase contributed to an increase in aircraft energy and the aircraft deviated above the glide path. At about 300 feet above ground level (agl), the surface wind began to shift from a headwind component to a 10-knot tailwind component, increasing the aircraft's groundspeed and effectively changing the flight path. The aircraft crossed the runway threshold about 40 feet above the normal threshold crossing height. Approaching the threshold, the aircraft entered an intense downpour, and the forward visibility became severely reduced. When the aircraft was near the threshold, the crew members became committed to the landing and believed their go-around option no longer existed. The touchdown was long because the aircraft floated due to its excess speed over the threshold and because the intense rain and lightning made visual contact with the runway very difficult. The aircraft touched down about 3800 feet from the threshold of Runway 24L, which left about 5100 feet of runway available to stop. The aircraft overran the end of Runway 24L at about 80 knots and was destroyed by fire when it entered the ravine. Selection of the thrust reversers was delayed as was the subsequent application of full reverse thrust. The pilot not flying (PNF) did not make the standard callouts concerning the spoilers and thrust reversers during the landing roll. This further contributed to the delay in the PF selecting the thrust reversers. Because the runway was contaminated by water, the strength of the crosswind at touchdown exceeded the landing limits of the aircraft. . There were no landing distances indicated on the operational flight plan for a contaminated runway condition at the Toronto/Lester B. Pearson International Airport (CYYZ). Despite aviation routine weather reports (METARs) calling for thunderstorms at CYYZ at the expected time of landing, the crew did not calculate the landing distance required for Runway 24L. Consequently, they were not aware of the margin of error available for the landing runway nor that it was eliminated once the tailwind was experienced. Although the area up to 150 m beyond the end of Runway 24L was compliant with Aerodrome Standards and Recommended Practices (TP 312E), the topography of the terrain beyond this point, along the extended runway centreline, contributed to aircraft damage and to the injuries to crew and passengers. The downpour diluted the firefighting foam agent and reduced its efficiency in dousing the fuel-fed fire, which eventually destroyed most of the aircraft. Findings as to Risk In the absence of clear guidelines with respect to the conduct of approaches into convective weather, there is a greater likelihood that crews will continue to conduct approaches into such conditions, increasing the risk of an approach and landing accident. A policy where only the captain can make the decision to conduct a missed approach can increase the likelihood that an unsafe condition will not be recognized early and, therefore, increase the time it might otherwise take to initiate a missed approach. Although it could not be determined whether the use of the rain repellent system would have improved the forward visibility in the downpour, the crew did not have adequate information about the capabilities and operation of the rain repellent system and did not consider using it. The information available to flight crews on initial approach in convective weather does not optimally assist them in developing a clear idea of the weather that may be encountered later in the approach. During approaches in convective weather, crews may falsely rely on air traffic control (ATC) to provide them with suggestions and directions as to whether to land or not. Some pilots have the impression that ATC will close the airport if weather conditions make landings unsafe; ATC has no such mandate. Wind information from ground-based measuring systems (anemometers) is critical to the safe landing of aircraft. Redundancy of the system should prevent a single-point failure from causing a total loss of relevant wind information. The emergency power for both the public address (PA) and EVAC alert systems are located in the avionics bay. A less vulnerable system and/or location would reduce the risk of these systems failing during a survivable crash. Brace commands were not given by the cabin crew during this unexpected emergency condition. Although it could not be determined if some of the passengers were injured as a result, research shows that the risk of injury is reduced if passengers brace properly. Safety information cards given to passengers travelling in the flight decks of Air France Airbus A340-313 aircraft (inspectors or passengers seated on the jump-seats) do not include illustrations depicting emergency exit windows, descent ropes or the evacuation panel in the flight deck doors. There are no clear visual cues to indicate that some dual-lane slides actually have two lanes. As a result, these slides were used mostly as single-lane slides. This likely slowed the evacuation, but this fact was not seen as a contributing factor to the injuries suffered by the passengers. Although all passengers managed to evacuate, the evacuation was impeded because nearly 50 per cent of the passengers retrieved carry-on baggage. Other Findings There is no indication that the captain's medical condition or fatigue played a role in this occurrence. The crew did not request long aerodrome forecast (TAF) information while en route. This did not affect the outcome of this occurrence because the CYYZ forecast did not change appreciably from information the flight crew members received before departure, and they received updated METARs for CYYZ and Niagara Falls International Airport (KIAG). The possibility of a diversion required the flight crew to check the weather for various potential alternates and to complete fuel calculations. Although these activities consumed considerable time and energy, there is no indication that they were unusual for this type of operation or that they overtaxed the flight crew. The decision to continue with the approach was consistent with normal industry practice, in that the crew could continue with the intent to land while maintaining the option to discontinue the approach if they assessed that the conditions were becoming unsafe. There is no indication that more sophisticated ATC weather radar information, had it been available and communicated to the crew, would have altered their decision to continue to land. It could not be determined why door L2 opened before the aircraft came to a stop. There is no indication that the aircraft was struck by lightning. There is no information to indicate that the aircraft encountered windshear during its approach and landing. The flight crew seats are certified to a lower standard than the cabin seats, which may have been a factor in the injuries incurred by the captain.

The aircraft was on a cargo flight from Baghdad to Bahrein. It was impacted by a surface-to-air missile shortly after takeoff from the Baghdad International Airport (Irak). The wing and wing devices are seriously damaged. All the three hydraulic circuit are lost: the moveable parts of the plane (ailerons, rudder, elevator …) are frozen. Many warnings are triggered. The aircraft is uncontrollable and fly by its own. The crew discovered that the aircraft attitude can be managed by adjusting the thrust on the engines. It allowed them to successfully return to Baghdad and landed the Airbus A300 despite the serious damage. 25 minutes after the impact, the aircraft came to a stop in the dirt off Baghdad International's main runway. All 3 crew members escaped safely the aircraft and they only sustained minor injuries. Download the video of this event here:

On November 12, 2001, about 09:16:15 eastern standard time, American Airlines flight 587, an A300-605R, N14053, crashed into a residential area of Belle Harbor, New York, shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York. Flight 587 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Las Americas International Airport, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, with 2 flight crewmembers, 7 flight attendants, and 251 passengers aboard the airplane. The airplane's vertical stabilizer and rudder separated in flight and were found in Jamaica Bay, about 1 mile north of the main wreckage site. The airplane's engines subsequently separated in flight and were found several blocks north and east of the main wreckage site. All 260 people aboard the airplane and 5 people on the ground were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. The investigation showed that the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by the first officer's unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs (while the aircraft was shaken by wake turbulence). Contributing to these rudder pedal inputs were characteristics of the Airbus A300-600 rudder system design and elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program.

The aircraft was on a passenger flight from Toronto, Ontario, Canada to Lisbon, Portugal when a problem developed with the fuel system approximately 300 NM (540 km) northeast of Terciera Island, Azores Islands, Portugal. The crew elected to divert to Terciera Island for an emergency landing. The Captain reported that approximately 100 NM (180 km) from the airport, the left engine failed, and some ten minutes later, the right engine failed as well. The aircraft, using a minimal amount of hydraulic and electrical power supplied from its Ram Air Turbine, continued gliding toward Terciera Island in a gradual descent. The Captain reported that the flight arrived over Terciera Island at FL150 (15,000 feet – 4500 m), at dawn, and so he elected to make a visual approach to the airport with no engine power. The total flying time without engine power was in the neighbourhood of 17 to 18 minutes. The aircraft sustained minor damage during the landing, including damage to the landing gear as twelve tires exploded upon touchdown. None of the 298 passengers and crew members was injured. Reports indicate that a fuel line which had been replaced several days before became severed, leading to a fuel leak of approximately 37,000 gallons over the Atlantic Ocean.

The aircraft was conducting a normal approach to runway 12 at Bahrain International Airport with autopilot/flight director disconnected upon visual contact with the runway. Approximately 1 NM from touchdown, at about 600 feet AMSL and at an airspeed of 185 kts, the crew requested a left-hand orbit (360° turn) because they were too high and fast on the approach. During the tight (36° bank angle) left hand turn the flaps were fully extended and the landing checklist completed. When the aircraft crossed the extended runway centerline the crew reported they wanted to abort the landing. A controller gave the crew clearance to climb to 2,500 feet at a 300° heading to prepare for another approach. The plane's speed began increasing to 185 kts as it began to climb to 1000 ft in a 5° nose-up attitude. During the go-around at approximately 1,000 ft, the aircraft entered a rapid descent, 15° nose down. As the GPWS sounded, the captain ordered the flaps to be raised and moved the sidestick back. The A320 impacted the sea at a 6.5° nose down angle, about 1NM north of the airport. The plane's last recorded airspeed was about 280 knots. All the 143 people onboard were killed. Investigations concluded that the causes of the crash are: The captain did not adhere to a number of SOPs; such as: significantly higher than standard aircraft speeds during the descent and the first approach; not stabilising the approach on the correct approach path; performing an orbit, a non-standard manoeuvre, close to the runway at low altitude; not performing the correct go-around procedure; etc. In spite of a number of deviations from the standard flight parameters and profile, the first officer (PNF) did not call them out, or draw the attention of the captain to them, as required by SOP’s. A perceptual study indicated that during the go-around after the orbit, it appears that the flight crew experienced spatial disorientation, which could have caused the captain to perceive (falsely) that the aircraft was ‘pitching up’. He responded by making a ‘nose-down’ input, and as a result, the aircraft descended and flew into the shallow sea. Neither the captain nor the first officer perceived, or effectively responded to, the threat of increasing proximity to the ground, in spite of repeated hard GPWS warnings. Moreover, Operator non-compliance with some critical regulatory Requirements and operator organisations have been identified as contributing factors.

Shortly after the aircraft departed Chania, Greece, for a passenger flight to Hanover, Germany, the flight crew realized that the landing gear could not be retracted. The decision was made to continue the flight to Hanover at a lower altitude and airspeed with the landing gear extended. As the aircraft neared the mid-point of its journey, the crew realized that the remaining fuel would be insufficient to continue the flight to Hanover, so a landing was planning at Vienna, Austria. As the aircraft descended through 10,000 feet, the left engine failed due to fuel exhaustion. By utilizing crossfeed fuel pumps, the crew was able to keep the right engine running, but was unable to restart the left. As the aircraft turned a six-mile final, the right engine also failed due to fuel exhaustion. The plane touched down 600 feet short of runway 34, collapsing the main landing gear, and seriously damaging the left wing and engine. None of the 150 people onboard received serious injuries.

The Air Afrique Airbus A300 was preparing to depart Dakar-Yoff Airport for a passenger flight to Paris. During taxi before takeoff, a warning indicated that the left main landing gear was not properly locked. The crew discontinued the departure and began taxiing back toward the parking area.

The A310 was on a passenger flight, and departed from Abidjan. The aircraft crashed into the Atlantic Ocean shortly after takeoff from Abidjan. Numerous eyewitnesses who saw the airplane takeoff reported that it failed to gain altitude and struck the water around a mile from the runway. 10 survivors were pulled from the water by rescue boats. 169 people died. The Commission of Inquiry concluded that the cause of the accident to flight KQ 431 on 30 January 2000 was a collision with the sea that resulted from the pilot flying applying one part of the procedure, by pushing forward on the control column to stop the stick shaker, following the initiation of a stall warning on rotation, while the airplane was not in a true stall situation. In fact, the FCOM used by the airline states that whenever a stall warning is encountered at low altitude (stick shaker activation), it should be considered as an immediate threat to the maintenance of a safe flight path. It specifies that at the first sign of an imminent stall or at the time of a stick shaker activation, the following actions must be undertaken simultaneously: thrust levers in TOGA position, reduction of pitch attitude, wings level, check that speed brakes are retracted. The investigation showed that the pilot flying reduced the pitch attitude but did not apply TOGA thrust on the engines. The investigation was unable to determine if the crew performed the other two actions: leveling the wings and checking that the speed brakes were retracted. The following elements contributed to the accident: the pilot flying's action on the control column put the airplane into a descent without the crew realizing it, despite the radio altimeter callouts; the GPWS warnings that could have alerted the crew to an imminent contact with the sea were masked by the priority stall and overspeed warnings, in accordance with the rules on the prioritization of warnings; the conditions for a takeoff performed towards the sea and at night provided no external visual references that would have allowed the crew to be aware of the direct proximity of the sea.